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çÉÌÅÍÈÁÎ íÕÂÁÒÁËÛÉÎ: Hydropower Sector of Kyrgyzstan in the Context of Solving the Water-Energy Problems in the Central Asia
By B.N Mubarakshin
The Kyrgyz Republic belongs to the countries with sizeable water resources. In spite of an enormous hydropower potential of the republic`s rivers the national energy sector strongly depends on the Toktogul water power plant`s functioning, which is also important for maintaining water-energy balance in the Central Asia. In conditions of unremitting quarrelling over working regimes of this station construction of the Kambarata hydropower stations cascade in Kyrgyzstan can be considered as one of the most optimal ways to solve regional water-energy problems.
Rational use of water-energy resources of the Aral Sea basin rivers is the most difficult regional problem of Central Asia. Back in the Soviet period Central Asian republics often had disputes, which, however, were skillfully settled by the Union authorities. Peaceful co-existence of the republics was achieved with an integrated system of regional water-energy resources management. The system prioritized irrigation and farming on the Central Asian lowlands (the low reaches of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya) and hydropower generation developed in the highlands. The inevitable misbalances were compensated with inter-republican supplies of energy and agricultural products.
The once smoothly operating system started to fail with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the breakup of economic bonds. As the centralized energy supply ceased to exist, Central Asian republics became preoccupied with taking urgent measures towards energy independence which they mistook for maximal use of their own resources and often moved to the background the regional water-energy architecture, which was being built for decades. Development of the national hydropower industry became a natural instrument to achieve energy security of Kyrgyzstan, which has few hydrocarbons but possesses colossal water resources.
Hydropower Potential of Kyrgyzstan
The Kyrgyz Republic stands out amongst Central Asian states with its ample water resources: 51.2 cubic kilometers of surface river flow, 13 cubic kilometers of potential subterranean water resources, 1,745 cubic kilometers of lake water and 650 cubic kilometers of glaciers. Flows of large transboundary rivers, such as the Naryn, the Chu, the Talas, the Sary-Jaz and so on, form on the republic`s territory. High gradients of the rivers caused by the highland terrain create favorable conditions for massive hydropower projects. The overall hydropower potential of Kyrgyzstan is estimated at 18.5 million kilowatt of power output and 142.5 billion kilowatt/hours of electricity generation, and slightly more than 9% of the resources are being used at present. According to Hydroproyekt surveys, it is possible to build 95 large and medium power plants on the republican rives with the total capacity of 11,400 megawatt and the average yearly generation of 49.8 billion kilowatt/hours[1]. The Kyrgyz Republic is inferior only to Russia and Tajikistan in the CIS by these parameters.
Hydropower plants occupy a central place in the national energy system of the Kyrgyz Republic; they contribute about 80% of the electricity consumed by the republic. In 2011 the country generated 14.9 billion kilowatt/hours of electricity, and hydropower plants accounted for approximately 90%[2] of the total amount. The Nizhne-Naryn hydropower plant cascade: the Toktogul HPP (1,200 megawatt), the Kurpsai HPP (800 megawatt), the Tashkumyr HPP (450 megawatt), the Shamaldysai HPP (240 megawatt) and the Uchkurgan HPP (180 megawatt) form the Kyrgyz electric power industry, which operates 21 hydropower plants with the total capacity of 3,071 megawatt. Small power plants - Alamedinskiye, Lebedinovskaya, Bystrovskaya, Kalininskaya and some others - help reduce the burden on the Kyrgyz energy system.
The Toktogul HPP, which was put into operation in 1975, is the flagship of the Kyrgyz hydropower industry. Apart from offering sizable generating facilities to the national energy system, it plays an exclusively important role in the regulation of water-energy relations in Central Asia. The hydropower plant`s dam lake was designed as a huge reservoir (with the full size of 19.5 cubic kilometers and the service size of 14 cubic kilometers) capable of accumulating water for irrigation needs of Uzbekistan and South Kazakhstan in the period of cotton crop vegetation through many years of regulation of the Naryn River flow. The hydropower plant operation protocol was designed to provide its maximum use in the vegetation period (April-October) and minimal use in the other seasons when water was accumulated in the dam lake.
In the Soviet period electricity generated by the hydropower plant was distributed within the unified energy system of Central Asia, an umbrella to generation facilities and power transmission lines of all the five Central Asian republics (with the exception of Northern Kazakhstan that ran in the parallel regime with energy systems of the Urals and Siberia). Thermal power plants partially compensated for regional electricity needs in the winter season. Operation of the Toktogul HPP within the unified energy system facilitated control of generation and consumption of electric power in the peak periods (maximal and minimal) that had negative influence on the technical condition of thermal power plants intended to work under basic (constant) load [3].
Problem of Toktogul hydropower complex
As Central Asian republics became independent, the integrated system of management of regional water-energy resources underwent significant transformations. The agreement signed by the five republics in Almaty in 1992 preserved the former system of regional division of water resources, which appeared to be beneficial only for "lowland countries" - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - under the new circumstances. Being free from their commitments to supply energy and agricultural products to their neighbors, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, they continued to receive a large part of water from upper reaches of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya for free. This "injustice" could not have satisfied the "highland countries". For instance, the Kyrgyz Republic guided with the national socioeconomic development interests, preferred to use water of the biggest regional water reservoir, Toktogul, for round-the-year generation of electricity. Then the dam lake started to accumulate water already in summer, in the period of minimal electricity needs, which was at stark contrast with the tasks set in its design and initial operation.
Amid the permanent energy crisis, that Kyrgyzstan plunged into in the early 1990s because of the lack of fuel and energy resources (it had to buy from neighbors at prices close to the world ones), the new formula enabled the republic not only to meet its own electricity needs but even export electricity for handsome amounts of foreign currency. Yet in spite of the obvious benefits of the new regime of the Toktogul HPP operation, it also had major shortcomings. The altered operation regime caused serious hydrographic deformation of the transboundary Syr Darya: before the construction of the Toktogul hydropower complex the river had a natural winter flow of 2.8 cubic kilometers and a summer flow of 8.5 cubic kilometers, but the winter and summer flows swapped places after the hydropower plant started to run in the new mode. The winter flow reached 8.5 cubic kilometers, and the flow in the vegetation period neared 3.5-4.9 cubic kilometers of water[4].
Icebound water in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya led to floods in Southern Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with some of the water dumped from the dam lake in the winter season. Meanwhile, in summer the republics` irrigation systems had a sharp deficit of water, which seriously damaged farming and escalated tensions between regional states. For instance, the water-energy conflict of winter 2000 between Tashkent and Bishkek almost developed into a military operation: Uzbekistan deployed a military unit in the direct proximity to the Kyrgyz border and held exercises simulating seizure of the Toktogul hydropower plant with armor and helicopters. Kyrgyz authorities leaked information to claim that water from the blasted dam would "wipe off the earth the Fergana and Zerafshan valleys of Uzbekistan"[5].
The changed mode of the Toktogul hydropower complex operation had a boomerang effect on the energy security of Kyrgyzstan itself. Water reserves in the dam lake started to reduce catastrophically year after year with the increased winter dumping. When the former irrigation mode was in effect, the dam lake had stored about 12-15 billion cubic kilometers of water by the beginning of the vegetation season (in April); no more than 6-7 billion cubic kilometers of water were amassed in the recent years (and the minimal amount of water to keep the hydropower plant running is 5.5 billion cubic kilometers). The low head made the hydropower plant unable to reach the rated capacity and the projected amounts of electricity output, which resulted in annual losses of 30-40%[6]. Bearing in mind recurring low water years, which are frequently accompanied with long cold periods, the situation could have the most serious consequences for the republican energy system. Shrinking reserves of the shallow Toktogul dam lake might have been insufficient even for generating electricity in winter. The scenario was narrowly escaped in spring 2008 when the reservoir stored 6.4 billion cubic kilometers of water[7] close to the "dead" mark by the beginning of the vegetation season. Energy consumption had to be limited and rolling back-outs of ten to twelve hours occurred throughout the republic for raising the water level in the dam lake and enlarging the output of the Toktogul hydropower plant.
Attempts to solve the problem of the operation mode of the Toktogul hydropower complex have been made more than once. From 1995 through 1998 regional states signed about a dozen of agreements regulating operation of the hydropower plant to one degree or another. Regional energy companies pinned great hopes on the agreement the Prime Ministers of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan signed on March 17, 1998, to use water-energy resources of the basin of the Syr Darya River (Tajikistan joined the accord in 1999). The document specified the amounts of water Kyrgyzstan was compelled to dispatch from the Toktogul hydropower complex to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the vegetation period. In turn, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan pledged to buy equal amounts of Kyrgyz electricity generated in the summer season beyond the domestic demand. Countries located in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya also undertook a commitment to supply the Kyrgyz Republic with fuel and electricity in order to compensate for the winter electricity deficit. In fact, the formula attempted to reanimate the former Soviet system of inter-republican exchanges of electricity and water that supplemented hydropower resources of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with fossil fuel of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
However, the formula that successfully operated in the Soviet period appeared hardly viable under the conditions of market economy and independent states. The aforesaid document was a framework accord lacking specifics; it did not indicate ways of settling disputes or guarantees of the parties under force majeure circumstances. It did not specify technical aspects of compensation mechanisms, which failed to satisfy "lowland countries" in low water years and "highland countries" in medium water years and contradicted the interests of all parties in high water years. In the end, disagreements rooted in the document caused mutual claims and the states revoked the multilateral accord in favor of signing annual bilateral protocols.
The so-called "economic mechanism of transboundary water resources management" proposed by the Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower Engineering of the Kyrgyz National Academy of Sciences as a solution to the water-energy problem of Central Asia did not gain understanding of regional neighbors either. The mechanism stipulated the establishment of a special inter-state tariff for neighbors who used water resources regulated by Kyrgyz hydropower complexes for the simultaneous account of water costs as a natural resource and costs of water supply (hydropower complex operation costs). Besides, the economic mechanism suggested additional payment by "lowland countries" determined by the annual damage incurred by the Kyrgyz Republic from the construction (missed profit caused by the impossibility to use flooded lands) and operation of the Toktogul dam lake in the irrigation regime (budget losses from non-generated and unsold electric power).
Kambarata hydropower plant projects
As the regional water-energy dialog is progressing with difficulty, the commissioning of new generation facilities, primarily the Kambarata 1 and Kambarata 2 hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan, may help solve the problem of the Nizhne-Naryn hydropower cascade operation. The power plants in the middle reaches of the Naryn above the Toktogul dam lake will be free from irrigation limitations and will be able to operate in the energy regime all the year round. Presumably, that will help the Toktogul hydropower complex to return into the normal irrigation mode and store winter water for the vegetation season in neighboring republics. Losses of the Kyrgyz energy system - inevitable in that case - will be compensated for by the Kambarata hydropower plants. Simultaneous work of the two hydropower cascades in the summer season will allow the republic to export about 6-8 billion kilowatt/hours of electric power each year[8].
Construction of the Kambarata hydropower plants started in 1986, but the works were stopped in the early 1990s due to the lack of funds. It was decided to resume the projects in 2008 when Kyrgyzstan restarted by itself the construction of the Kambarata 2 hydropower plant of 360 megawatt. Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev agreed at the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) Bishkek Summit in October 2008 to relaunch the project of Kambarata 1 with the rated capacity of 1,900 megawatt. An intergovernmental agreement to the effect was signed in February 2009 but a discord between the two states and sociopolitical cataclysms in the republic suspended the project.
It became possible to resume the project several years later. At the first meeting of the Presidential Commission for Fuel and Energy Affairs held in July 2012 newly elected President Vladimir Putin listed the Kambarata 1 hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan as a major investment project of the Russian electric power industry in the medium-term prospect and a project of "strategic interest for Russia". Several months later, during an official visit of the Russian leader to the republic on September 19-20, 2012, Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed a new agreement to build the hydropower plant. According to that document, Russia`s Inter RAO UES established in 2009 and Kyrgyz Electric Stations Company will implement the Kambarata 1 project with equal shares in the authorized capital. Importantly, the new agreement linked the project with the construction of a 500 kilovolt power grid incorporating the Datka-Kemin republican power line and interstate power lines Kyrgyzstan-SUAR, Kemin-Almaty and Datka-Khujand. They were supposed to export electricity from the power plant not only to neighboring republics but also to South Asian countries within the project CASA-1000.
Intensification of Russia-Kyrgyzstan interaction on the regional water-energy track caused rather nervous reaction in the lowland countries, primarily Uzbekistan. While the agreements were still being drafted, Uzbek President Islam Karimov during an official visit to Kazakhstan, strongly opposed the construction of the Kambarata 1 hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan and the Rogun hydropower plant in Tajikistan. The Uzbek leader said, "the projects were generated back in the 1970-1980s when the Soviet Union was suffering from gigantomania. It was decided to build a dam of 275 meters in Kambarata 1 and a dam of 350 meters in Rogun. These are the world`s tallest dams. It seems our neighbors decided to beat Guinness records. But they should think about millions of people who cannot live without water, rather than records." The Uzbek President recalled that three quakes measuring nine to ten points occurred in the area of the projected construction of the Kambarata hydropower plant within a few hundreds of years. "If this dam is busted, 19 billion cubic kilometers of water will add from the Toktogul water reservoir. What will happen if a 50-100 meters tall wave rolls down? The situation may exacerbate so much to cause not just a confrontation but even wars[9]," Karimov said.
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev supported his opinion and called for assessment by international experts before the construction of such enormous regional facilities. In the opinion of both presidents, an important condition of the construction of hydropower complexes on transboundary rivers should be their mandatory coordination with the "lowland countries" pursuant to UN environmental conventions[10]. In this context the invitation of regional countries to the hydropower plant project made by the Russian leader during his visit to Bishkek was extremely topical. "We should bear in mind the concerns of all regional countries and work in order to remove them. This is possible if we have mutual understanding and build up confidence. We invite our partners to the joint work," Putin stressed at a press conference. Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev shared the opinion and assured journalists that he was ready to "work with neighbors and live in peace and friendship." He noted that the Kambarata hydropower plant was intended to solve problems of irrigation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which meant they needed it in the first turn. "If Kambarata 1 is built, it will be possible to dump its water and store it in the Toktogul reservoir, which will be beneficial for other countries, as well[11]," the Kyrgyz leader said.
The concerns of the administrations of the "highland countries" and those shared by a part of the expert community would be doubtlessly removed if we understand why the Kambarata project is important and how other Central Asia states should bÕ involved in the project.
Naturally, there must be no artificial politicization of the issue and the concerns should derive primarily from economic and, partially, from social causes. Regional economic integration may contribute to the settlement of the water energy problem of Central Asia in a broader context. It seems the development of efficient economic mechanisms for rational joint use of water-energy resources and the provision of reliable guarantees of Central Asia sustainable development in the future are possible only within this framework.
Hydropower Sector of Kyrgyzstan in the Context of Solving the Water-Energy Problems in the Central Asia.
By B.N. Mubarakshin
Summary: The Kyrgyz Republic belongs to the countries with sizeable water resources. In spite of an enormous hydropower potential of the republic`s rivers the national energy sector strongly depends on the Toktogul water power plant`s functioning, which is also important for maintaining water-energy balance in the Central Asia. In conditions of unremitting quarrelling over working regimes of this station construction of the Kambarata hydropower stations cascade in Kyrgyzstan can be considered as one of the most optimal ways to solve regional water-energy problems.
Keywords
Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Toktogul dam, Kambarata HPS, water-energy problems
Notes
[1] Rakhimov ë., Belyakov Yu. Hydropower Engineering of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, IC Tekhnik, 2006. pg.3.
[2] Report of the Kyrgyz Republic Government Performance in 2011, B. Uchkun, 2012. pg123.
[3] Kravtsov N. Hydropower Engineering of Kyrgyzstan and Regimes of Use of Naryn River Flow: Theses of the report delivered at the conference "Dialog of Central Asia and Caucasus Countries on Water Cooperation" B. 2008. pg.54.
[4] Yakubov H. Joint Use of Surface and Subterranean Waters of the Syr Darya River Basin - Fundamentals of Water Resources Management [online resource] http://www.icwc-aral.uz/15years/pdf/yakubov_et_all_ru.pdf
[5] Kirsanov I. Battle for Water in Central Asia // Independent Observer of CIS Member States. 2006. No12. [online resource] http://www.fundeh.org/publications/articles/48/
[6] Allabergenov N. Rational and Efficient Use of Water and Energy Resources - the Imperative of Time [online resource] http://sreda.uz/index.php?newsid=288
[7] Kasymova V. Fundamentals of Anti-Crisis Management in Energy Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic. B.: 2009. pg.91.
[8] Tian-Shan energy industry flagship // Rossiyskaya Gazeta December 22, 2011 [online resource] http://www.rg.ru/files/special_editions/data/417.pdf
[9] All is worked out ... Moscow and Bishkek extend relations // íë Asia September 25, 2012. Pg 14.
[10] The UN Economic Commission for Europe Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki 1992) and the UN Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (New York, 1997). The documents are supported by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because they call for taking into accounts the interests of water users in the medium and low reaches of transboundary waters. In turn, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan stick to the principles elaborated at the UN Dublin conference in 1992, which regard water as a commodity.
[11]Moldalieva á. Kyrgyzstan and Russia - Equal Partners / á.Moldalieva // Slovo Kyrgyzstana September 21, 2012. Pg 8.
